by Pavel Luzin
March 25, 2024
Introduction:
Read more here: https://www.eurasiareview.com/25032024 ... nalysis/(Eurasia Review) In recent weeks, Russian President Vladimir Putin has outlined the Kremlin’s negotiation proposal. He has proposed conducting strategic arms and space negotiations in exchange for pausing the fighting in Ukraine. The nuclear blackmail toward the United States and its allies is a part of this framework.
Other Russian officials and experts loyal to the Kremlin are playing good cop/bad cop in outlining these negotiations. The harsher officials insist on the capitulation of Ukraine, while the softer ones are promoting a so-called “Korean Scenario.” The latter describes a ceasefire–or at least decreasing the intensity of warfare–and keeping all the occupied territories in Russian hands.
One possible explanation for why the Kremlin is pushing the “Korean Scenario” is a consistent exhaustion of the arms storage bases that Russia inherited from the Soviet Union. This exhaustion is still in process, but Russia may lose its offensive potential by 2025 as these stores are used up (Kremlin.ru, February 20; blocked, February 23;Kremlin.ru, February 29; Kremlin.ru, March 1; blocked_telegram, March 14 – see linked article for these hyperlinked sources).
Soviet-era arms storage bases are one of the primary sources that still allow the Russian armed forces to fight despite massive losses on the battlefield. Russia has been removing supplies of tanks, armored vehicles, and artillery from these storage bases since 2022. The arms produced in the 1940s–1960s—many of which were decommissioned many years or decades ago—have returned to the battlefield. The stored arms are also massively cannibalized for spare parts, which Russian arms factories and hundreds of field arms repair facilities utilize (The Moscow Times, August 7, 2023; TASS, November 22, 2023; Vedomosti, December 30, 2023; Interfax, January 31; TASS, February 20- see linked article for these hyperlinked sources).
These storage bases are not endless despite Russia keeping thousands of tanks and howitzers after 1991. Moreover, Russia cannot replenish these arms and material. If Ukraine can maintain a high level of combat intensity and the mounting level of Russian losses continues in 2024, it will be much harder for the Russian army to maintain its military power for offensive operations in 2025. That means the conventional Russian military threat to states other than Ukraine will become much more limited.
